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Remembering the Impossible Possibilityμ Kierkegaard and 
Human Capital 
Now there is room, now you can venture.1 
 
What is the relevance of Kierkegaard as a political thinker? How might a reading of 
Kierkegaard constitute a response to our times? We mean to follow εario Tronti’s surprising 
advice: that to explore capitalism in the present (to diagnose its effects, and to seek a remedy 
for them) we should read the work of Kierkegaard.2 This is because, for Tronti, the latest 
form of capitalism is subjective. Having conquered the external world, destroying the 
vestiges of political resistance, capitalism is seeking to conquer the internal one, too. This 
does not mean that we should read Kierkegaard in order to find an authentic subjectivity 
against capitalism, because this new subjective form of capitalism is all about being authentic 
and so it can easily be co-opted. On the contrary, we shall argue that whatever the self is in 
Kierkegaard, it cannot be equated with any simple image of the authentic individual that is 
resolutely for themselves and against others, but precisely the opposite. To be truly a self is to 
be open to the other. It is to be other to oneself as oneself. Such a passionate self is exactly 
the opposite of the image of the self as presented in human capital, whose only relations to 
others are one of self-interest. We argue that the difference between these two conceptions, as 
presented by Kierkegaard, is ontological. It is the difference between essence and existence, 
the finite and infinite, and the actual and the possible. The precedence given to the self in 
                                                 
1
 Søren Kierkegaard, Concluding Unscientific Postscript to the Philosophical Crumbs, trans. by Alastair Hannay 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009), p. 358. 
2
 ‘Grandezza di Hegel avercela raccontata per come era. Marx ha fatto bene a prendere coscienza, su questa 
base, delle leggi di movimento del capitalismo. Ma per andare oltre di esso, invece che partire da Hegel, forse 
era meglio partire da Kierkegaard.’ [It was the greatness of Hegel to have told it like it was. On this basis, Marx 
was right to become aware of the laws of movement of capitalism. But to go beyond him, it was perhaps better 
to have started with Kierkegaard than Hegel]. Mario Tronti, La politica al tramonto (Torino: Einaudi, 1998), p. 
42. 
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human capital is therefore, for Kierkegaard, an ontological error, and not merely matter of 
choosing between authenticity and inauthenticity, for it reverses the relation between these 
terms, and confuses the condition with the conditioned. Before we get to the diagnosis of this 
error, whose detail will have to wait to the end of this paper, we want to explain why we 
agree with Tronti that in the current crisis it would be worth our while to read Kierkegaard 
again. 
The Tragedy of Politics 
In 1966, Mario Tronti, published the classic book of the Operismo movement in Italy, Operai 
e capitale [Workers and Capital], which runs like a hidden source throughout the writings of 
Italian political thinkers.3 His thesis is that the struggle at the heart of capitalism lies between 
the worker and capital. To enter the labour market, so classical economic theory tells us, the 
individual worker has to sell their expertise, skill and ability to an individual capitalist. The 
relation between work and capital is presented as though it were supposedly the relation 
between free individuals buying and selling objectified labour as salaried labour. For Tronti, 
however, such a model of the labour market is an idealisation. The individuality upon which 
the model depends is actually produced by that model. The worker already understands 
themselves as human capital as an investment for future earnings. I relate to myself as a 
commodity that has a certain value summed up by the level of a salary I might earn. The 
model does not take up what it already given. It has to produce a society where people 
already view themselves in this way. In this way, it is only capital that is truly free. The free 
individual is dependent on capital for his or her existence. This process of individualisation is 
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 Mario Tronti, Operai E Capitale. (Torino: Einaudi, 1966). 
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the objectification of the subject. In place of the living human subject, part of a larger societal 
whole, capital produces a generalised subjectivity. 
During the revolts of the ‘60s and ‘ι0s, Tronti hoped that the self-organisation of those 
workers, who knew their lives were mutilated by the monopoly of capital, could resist this 
objectification, thereby changing the nature of capitalism itself. Yet even in Operai e 
capitale, there is already the presentiment that such a political struggle is coming to an end. 
Rather than announcing a new age of politics, Tronti already pronounces its eulogy. The 
politics of revolution would be replaced by the politics of reflection, which is nothing but the 
management of capital. 
Does this mean that resistance is futile? We have to create new collectivities that have never 
been imagined, but to do so means we first of all have to win back our own subjectivity from 
the generalised subjectivity of human capital. If human capital is the objectification of 
subjectivity through salaried labour, then the passionate revolutionary act in the present age is 
to recover the self that continually escapes this process. Yet how can the self resist its own 
objectification, when it only recognises itself in this form? The objectification of the worker 
in human capital might be an ontic fact, but as the only possibility of existence it is always an 
ontological mistake. The point here is not say what the future is, for this would be always to 
define it in terms of a present actuality, but to demonstrate that the future is always open and 
only appears impossible from the viewpoint of the present. What is beneath the objectified 
self, is not an authentic individual defined in advance, but the power of the possible over the 
actual, which means that the actual is always a reduction of the possible, and the possible 
always greater than the actual. 
There is one reader who would profoundly disagree with our thesis that Kierkegaard’s work 
is a weapon against capital. Indeed, he would argue that his work is a symptom of the disease 
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rather than its cure. So we must next answer to his doubts and scepticism about our whole 
endeavour. 
The Philosopher of the Interior 
Of all the philosophers to take Kierkegaard seriously as a political thinker, Adorno was the 
quickest to condemn him as a philosopher, quite literally, of interiors. His shelter from 
history and the objective forces that seek to destroy him ‘is the bourgeois intérieur of the 
nineteenth century, before which all talk of subject, object, indifferentiation, and situation 
pales to an abstract metaphor’έ4 Inwardness is the result of such agoraphobia and not its 
original cause. I do not despise the streets and the crowds because I am an authentic 
individual, but retreat into the safety and security of my home, like the animal in Kafka’s The 
Burrow, because I fear them. The world then gets produced from my interior as though it was 
exterior, as I walk around my room, yet the true exteriority of the world is lost. As an isolated 
and solitary individual, I am separated, Adorno writes, from ‘the economic process of 
production’έ5 Thus the world that is reflected in my interior is not just a world lost, but a lost 
worldέ The relations between things and people have become ghostly and melancholicέ ‘The 
contents of the intérieur,’ Adorno writes, ‘are mere decoration, alienated from the purposes 
they represent, deprived of their own use-value, engendered solely by the isolated apartment 
that is created in the first place by their juxtapositionέ’6 It is not the objects that give meaning 
to my interior life, but my interior life the objects, which then become unmoored from their 
own objective existence. Such a desubstantialisation is the result of the ‘economic process’ of 
commodification and alienation that led to my retreat to my apartment in the first place. I 
                                                 
4
 Adorno, Theodor W., Kierkegaard: Construction of the Aesthetic, trans. by Robert Hullot-Kentor (University 
of Minnesota Press, 1989), p. 41. 
5
 Adorno, Theodor W., p. 42. 
6
 Adorno, Theodore W., p. 43. 
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construct my fortress against the disappearing world, but the reflection of the world in the 
mirror in my apartment only repeats its vanishing to a greater degree and extent and in such a 
way that I no longer have an historical relation to the world, but only an imaginary and 
symbolic one. The table is no longer a table, but a symbol, the chair is no longer a chair, and 
so on, as though the interior itself, created against the disappearance of the world, were to 
become the sign of an unchanging and eternal nature. Yet the world supposedly saved is just 
one more step in its ever increasing fading and decline, reduced to the distorted and 
misshapen view from my apartment peephole. 
 For Adorno, the real origin of the internal is the external, the inward, the historical, 
and the economic, the individual. The isolated individual is the result of social forces that 
isolate individuals and thus in no way can be a critical response to them. It is not the cure, but 
the consequence of the very disease it has discovered. The response to the alienation of the 
individual in modern society is not to retreat into inwardness but to rediscover the relation 
between the self and others that sustains even that society that disdains them. Yet there might 
be an objective reason why we might hesitate before Adorno’s critique because the very 
inwardness of the self has become the objectivity of the world, not for the reason he explains, 
that both the object and the subject have become objectless, but the world has become too 
‘subjectful’έ The furniture in Kierkegaard’s apartment, Adorno tells us, have become 
divorced and separated from the use-value of objects stripped from them by the ‘economic 
process’. Yet is it the authenticity of the object we should first of all concern us? For the 
‘economic process’ that led to their spectral presence lies not in the opposition of the internal 
and the external, but the internalisation of the external, the becoming subjective of capital. 
You might respond that this does not at all invalidate Adorno’s criticism, but simply situates 
the problem at another level. The inwardness of the self is just a pale reflection of this 
subjectification, an answer confusing itself with the question, so it makes no difference 
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whether we situate this alienation of the side of the self or the object. Our reply would be that 
the movement of inwardness, precisely because it is a relation to the outside, is a resistance to 
this subjectification and not merely its confirmation. The critic says inwardness is a mirror 
held up to reality of which it is merely a product but from which it mistakenly imagines that it 
has freed itself, like the suicide victim who thinks they have escaped the pain of existence but 
thereby have merely confirmed it once more and perhaps to the highest degree by their act. 
We say inwardness operates as a counter movement to subjectification at the same level of 
experience. It is not external, if only imagined, as a disfiguring ally. Subjectification is 
inwardness captured by capital. To think of inwardness, then, is to think what resists capital 
at the level of the self.  Adorno’s mistake is that he too quickly objectifies Kierkegaard. The 
interior of the self is nothing but the intérieur, the apartment, the self in retreat from the 
world. Yet this is not what inwardness is at all. It is to confuse it with its opposite, 
subjectification. 
 The objectified self of subjectification, the experience of the generalised subjectivity 
of our world, is human capital. Human capital, at the theoretical level, is the abolition of any 
distinction between the internal and the external. It is the heterogeneous, as opposed to 
homogenous, conception of capital, for in it capital contains its other. Traditionally, capital 
was divided into fixed and variable capital, where the latter referred only to the power of 
labour. Everything that lay outside this relation, the family, friendship, love, was outside of 
capital. Human capital abolishes this difference. Every possible human relation becomes a 
relation of capital. Thus it is perfectly possible for a classic work in the development of this 
concept to imagine the relation between the child and the parent to be a relation of capital: 
A particular class of human capital consisting of ‘child Capital’ may hold the key 
to an economic theory of populationέ The formation of ‘child Capital’ by the 
household, man and wife, would begin with the bearing of children and proceed 
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through their rearing through childhood. An investment approach to population 
growth is now breaking new ground.7 
It is passages such as these that startled even Foucault, who emphasises to his listeners, in his 
lecture course The Birth of Biopolitics (a course that is nothing else but the history of the 
genesis of the concept of human capital), that even the relation between parents and child is 
viewed as future investment.8 He goes on to explain that at the heart of human capital is an 
entirely new concept of the value of work. It is no longer measured objectively, as it is in 
Smith, Ricardo and Marx, but subjectively (it is this transformation that is missing in 
Adorno’s criticisms of Kierkegaard). How does the individual utilise resources given to 
them? How do they invest in themselves in the present, so as to profit in the future because of 
increased earnings? Work is no longer a limited question of an element within an objective 
economic process of production, but the very question of existence itself and thus a matter of 
life and death. Human capital analyses work not from the side of work (work as objectified) 
but from the viewpoint of the worker. I invest for the sake of future revenue (this is the 
general definition of capital). My salary is future revenue of capital. In this case, the capital is 
myself. I invest in myself in the present (education, training and health, for example) so that I 
can earn more in the future. This is the difference between Marxist analysis and neo-liberal 
one. In the former, I myself am appropriated by capital, whereas as for the latter, I myself am 
the capital, therefore, by definition I cannot be appropriated by it. For Marx, the expression 
‘human capital’ is an oxymoron. For the new theorist of capital, it is a tautology. I am a part 
of capital that produces a flux of revenues. I am myself am an enterprise and a subject of 
investment. Society is nothing but the unity of such individual enterprises whose smooth 
                                                 
7
 Theodore W Schultz, Investment in Human Capital : The Role of Education and of Research (New York: Free 
Press, 1970), p. vii. 
8
 In the lecture of the 14th March 1979 Michel Foucault, The Birth of Biopolitics : Lectures at the Collège de 
France, 1978-79, trans. by Michel Senellart (Basingstoke [England]; New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008), 
pp. 216–238. 
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operation is the sole purpose and function of the state. You might argue that is just the old 
notion of Homo economicus, but in so doing you would miss what is entirely new and novel 
in this phenomenon. If the rational agent of exchange is the traditional definition of the 
subject in classical economic theory, then in the concept of human capital I am not simple a 
partner of exchange but an entrepreneur, an entrepreneur of myself. I am nothing but a 
generalised self requiring investment and it is this investment, above all, that individualises 
me (my salary being an objectified mark of this differentiation). I am both capital and 
producer of capital. It is at this point that capital directly enters and determines life and the 
function and purpose of a rationally organised society, generally speaking, through control, 
screening and selection, becomes the amelioration, accumulation and increase of human 
capital alone. Such a capital has no exterior. It is life itself. 
 It is not a matter here, in response to what appears the remorseless victory of human 
capital, to appeal to an authentic individual who would be exterior to the flows of capital and 
labour, because it is precisely this authentic individual that is produced in the flows. Capital 
and subjectivity are synonymous in human capital, so any appeal to a self would be 
immediately interiorised. It is not as though in the contemporary age anyone thinks that we 
should be less authentic, objectified and alienated in work; rather work should be an 
expression of our creative freedomέ It is this ‘creative freedom’ that is our alienationέ It is not 
authentic individuality that is at stake here but what is more profound than any objectified 
subject, which is the possible. This is why Kierkegaard never tells us objectively what it 
means to be subjective (as though you might define this in advance). We must make the 
distinction between what the self is, its role and identity within society and how the self is. In 
the first case, the self is an actual self. It is the self arrived at the end of a process. It is the self 
I have invested in through my education, training and healthέ But the self as a ‘how’ is not a 
self in this sense at all; it is the self of the possible over and above the actual, rather than 
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subordinate to it. The first self is ontic; the second ontological. Human capital never goes to 
the limit of the objectified interiority of the self, even though it is utterly parasitical on its 
abilities and capacities that exceed it. What matters in the rationally governed society of 
human capital is the partial actualisation of possibilities and never the pure possibilities of life 
that precede any actualisation. This explains its fatalism and despair. 
The paradox of writing about Kierkegaard is in speaking about the passionate self you 
immediately change it into the actual self. This is the danger of examples. There is one way 
to avoid this danger. Rather than describing what he writes describe how he writes. 
Kierkegaard’s pseudonymous writing is the very practice of being a passionate self and it is 
to this we shall now turn. The form of his work is not merely an aesthetic contingency, but 
expresses the very difference between the actual and the possible self.9 
The Passion of Thinking 
The content of Kierkegaard’s thought cannot be separated from its formέ You cannot ignore 
how he writes as though you could get straight to his thought and disregard its style. 
Philosophy imagines thought could be communicated without the necessity of words. Of 
course it knows this is an impossible dream, but at best it suffers words as a means of 
communication rather than the real expression of thought. Words are merely the vehicle, 
whereas thought are what animate words from within. In this way, we can distinguish 
between thoughtless and thoughtful wordsέ Kierkegaard’s pseudonymous writing is not a 
mere addition, a trick meant to deceive the readers, whose exhausted response might be to 
                                                 
9
 Of course this is not the only performance in Kierkegaard work but it is the drama that produces it. Indeed you 
could argue that it is littered with such performances. The image we have in mind here is his famous analogy of 
the swimmer. ‘In learning to go through the motions of swimming, one can be suspended from the ceiling in a 
harness and then presumably describe the movements, but one is not swimmingέ’ Søren Kierkegaard, Fear and 
Trembling   Repetition, trans. by Howard V. Hong and Edna H. Hong (Princeton  N.J.: Princeton University 
Press, 1983), pp. 37–8.  
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say, ‘Well it really is Kierkegaard writing after all and we can ignore all these other namesέ’ 
This implies that he could have written otherwise than he did. Yet he tells us that he was 
under a compulsion to write this way and no other. Are we simply to ignore and mistrust his 
sincerity or is there an intimate relation between his thought and how he writes? 
 Kierkegaard himself could not be clearer on this matter. He tells the reader, in the 
appendix to Concluding Unscientific Postscript, ‘A First and δast Declaration’, that he is the 
author of all his works and his ‘pseudonymity or polyonymity’ is not ‘accidental […] but an 
essential basis in the production itselfέ’10 If it were not so, then it would be no problem to 
speak of him in the same way we speak of other philosophers and thereby insert thought 
easily within our historical canon. That he wrote under other names than his own was not 
because he wished to hide himself from some exterior reason, so for example to remain 
unknown to others, but an interior  relation to his thought itself.11 By ‘interior’, we do not 
mean the interior of Kierkegaard, of which we know nothing, as he himself does not, but the 
relation of thought to its own production. In other words, that thought itself, in relation to 
itself, is essentially anonymous, despite the intention of the author who writes the words. I 
think more than I am capable of thinkingέ It is this ‘more’ that is the basis of Kierkegaard’s 
pseudonymity, and not some hidden desire to conceal an actual selfέ Facing this ‘more’, 
Kierkegaard is on the side of the reader rather than himself, and can claim no more authority 
‘to know’ than theyέ 
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 Kierkegaard, Concluding Unscientific Postscript to the Philosophical Crumbs, p. 527. Emphasis in the 
original. 
11
 Such non-pseudonymous writings, for instance, which were written for the paper The Fatherland and the 
subsequent publication of the tracts of The Moment, whose personal attacks on well-known individuals and the 
sheer virulence of their style could have been ample cause for hiding behind an assumed authorship if this had 
been the reason for Kierkegaard’s pseudonymsέ See, Søren Kierkegaard, The Moment and Late Writings, trans. 
by Howard V. Hong and Edna H. Hong (Princeton  N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1998). 
11 
 
 Indirect communication, therefore, is not something that befalls his thought from 
without, whether from psychological, social or historical reasons (because, for example, he 
wanted to write without public censure), but because it is intrinsic to the nature of this 
thought, or any thought, where the object and activity of thought are split, and thinking places 
itself in this split as its very possibility. It is this separation that is the true meaning of 
subjective as opposed to objective thought. It is not that he is proposing a different thought 
from Hegel (even if we think that he thought is the thought that all thought is subjective), but 
this thinking cannot be expressed in a thought, not even this one, because of the separation 
between thinking and thought itself. This separation is made possible only in the essential 
basis of its own production that destroys the individual who writes. This is why the issue is 
not whether you should use the name ‘Kierkegaard’, when you refer to his pseudonymous 
writings, but that you know what this name means. It is the author who suffers his work as 
that which is furthest from himself as something known and actual and who communicates 
this lack of knowledge to the reader as the very movement of thought itself indirectly through 
writing. Writing is not something that thought suffers as an unnecessary burden, but the very 
suffering of thought not to be able to express itself as its own truth. 
 The difference between thinking and what is thought is the passion of thinking. The 
passion of thinking can only be communicated indirectly through the words themselves and 
not the ideas they are meant to contain, because I have no privilege access to them beyond the 
words that I write. The passion of thinking is only present when I am not present to myself, 
when my thought is more than I am capable of thinking. As readers of Kierkegaard, we have 
to guard ourselves against the temptation of reading him in the opposite way he wishes us to 
do so, and how he reads himself. We translate everything he has written into objective 
thought, into an actuality, into a product we might own and possess as an investment. In so 
doing, we would miss the passion of thinking, the movement of thought, which each one of 
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us is meant to enact for ourselves. For we precisely stop thinking when we think we now 
have the thought. The temptation is to think that by sheer effort of will, understanding and 
intellect, we can come to the end of his thought (of which we repeat, he knows no more than 
we do, even with his prefaces, introductions and appendices) by transmuting and translating 
this passion into an actual thought inserted into a litany of names making up what we know 
as the history of Western thought in its totality. The paradox of thinking is that I do not know 
what I think, not exactly anyway, no more than anyone else, and it this that keeps thinking 
thinkingέ It is not the closure of thought that is the object of thought (as in Aristotle’s famous 
definition of God, as thinking thinking thinking) but the possibility of thinking as the 
impossibility of thought.12 ‘This then,’ Kierkegaard writes in Philosophical Fragments, ‘is the 
ultimate paradox of thought: to want to discover something that thought itself cannot think. 
The passion of thought is fundamentally present everywhere in thought, also in the single 
individual’s thought insofar as he, thinking, is not merely himselfέ’13 
 I am thinking only to the extent I am not myself, rather than myself. This division in 
me is the line between thinking and what is thought in thinking. The truth of the passion of 
thinking, therefore, is not the truth of thought, which is the having or possessing of a true 
thought in actuality. My thinking is true only insofar as I am divided against myself, I do not 
know what I think, and it is this truth I communicate to the reader. This is why Kierkegaard 
calls the passion of thinking a ‘downfall’έ14 I do not want to say to you I have the truth and 
now I want to tell you what it is, rather I want to push my thinking to the limit of what it is 
possible for me to think, which means really what is not possible for me to think at the edge 
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 Aristotle, Metaphysics. Books X-XIV, trans. by Hugh Tredennick and G. Cyril Armstrong (Cambridge, Mass.: 
Harvard University Press, 1977), bk. 12, 9, 1074b34–35. 
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 Søren Kierkegaard, Philosophical Fragments, trans. by Howard V. Hong and Edna H. Hong (Princeton  N.J.: 
Princeton University Press, 1985), p. 37. 
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 Kierkegaard, Philosophical Fragments, p. 37. 
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of my thinking, so that you too will think. Only the passion of thinking communicates the 
passion of thought, which is not the same as the thought of a passion. I cannot put it into a 
thought for you, however much you might wish me to do so. You too must experience the 
‘downfall’ of your thinking in order to think. 
It is too hasty to call this passion subjective, as opposed to objective thought, because 
it is this separation between thinking and thought that makes the passion of thinking possible. 
Without the separation of thought, without its distance from me, there would be no passion. 
We need to distinguish, therefore, between the self that owns and possesses its thought and 
the self that is disowned and dispossessed by its thought. One relates to thought as actuality 
and the other as possibility. This distinction between the actual and the possible is more 
fundamental than the difference between subjective and objective thought, if you think of the 
one as inward, and the other as external. For thinking to be passionate it is not enough that it 
is merely interior, it has to be divided against itself, thinking that thinks a thought that is not 
itself. 
 The passion of thinking is the difference between the activity of thought and what is 
thought in this activity. Thinking itself cannot be an object of thought. This is the mistake that 
reflection makes when it believes it can get behind itself and capture the origin of thinking, 
like a snake biting its own tail. As soon as I make thinking an object of thought then it is no 
longer thinking but thought. The difference between thinking and thought can be experienced 
either negatively or positively. Negatively it is the ossification of thinking, its paralysis and 
stupefaction in actuality, as though thought where the end of thinking rather than its 
beginning, a blockage or impediment. It would be the melancholy we experience when we 
feel that nothing we write or say really expresses what we thought. The opposite of such a 
disappointment is the creativity of thinking. For if we could say or write all that we thought, 
would we not immediately stop thinking as well as those who might have the misfortune to 
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listen or read us? Would this not be the stupidity of thinking as opposed to the stupidity of 
thought? This is the danger of all fanaticisms. Thinking, understood positively, not as the 
absence of thought, but as the power and passion of thinking itself, overflows thought itself, 
such that there could never be a final wordέ Kierkegaard’s suspicion of Hegel (or better 
perhaps Hegelians, since in Hegel there is always the unease and movement of thinking) is 
that absolute objective knowledge would be, if it were achievable, the end of thinking, a kind 
complacency and satisfaction in the existing of order of things that he despised. No one 
would have to write or speak again, or if they did, it would only the repetition of what had 
already been thought. 
 What is the condition of the separation of thinking from what it thinks? It either 
comes from the side of thinker or what is thought. We have already addressed this 
phenomenon from the side of thinker. The subject is divided against themself. To the extent 
that I am really thinking then I am not myself. But how can a self not be itself in being itself? 
We might answer this by saying that the self is split. One part of the self thinks more than the 
other, such that I might say to you ‘I do not know what I think’έ There would the self that 
thinks, and the self that does not know what it thinks. The self that thinks, paradoxically since 
we associated thinking with self-consciousness, would be unconsciousness, as though there 
were hidden reservoirs to the self that could never be brought to the light of the day. Only at 
the level of thought is this unconscious self unknown. At the level of thinking it is the self 
that thinks, even though I do not know what this thinking is. It thinks in the place of me. Yet 
is this self, which thinks despite me, only an interior relation between a unconscious and 
conscious self or already a relation to something outside of itself? I am not merely myself 
because some part of myself is not known to me; rather I am not myself because I am already 
in a relation to another of which I cannot comprehend yet on which I am ultimately 
dependent. 
15 
 
 The difference between the two conditions is a difference between two relations of the 
actual and the possible. Either the actual determines the possible or the possible the actual, 
but in either case the determination cannot be the same. If the actual determines the possible, 
then is not the same as the determination by the possible. For what do we mean when we say 
that the possible determines, if we mean that it does so in the same way as the actual? The 
actual determines the possible by limiting itέ It is, to use Kierkegaard’s language (through the 
pseudonym of Anti-Climacus) of the opening of The Sickness unto Death, a ‘negative 
unity’έ15 When the possible determines the actual, on the contrary, it expands and inflates it, 
not from within, but by relating it to, what he calls on the same page, a ‘positive third’έ This 
‘positive third’ is God, but we should not confuse this with an objective reality proved by 
thought. The self relates to God not as an actuality, as though it were merely one more item to 
be added onto the world, but as a possibility reached only when it has come to the end of 
every possibility. It is a possibility experienced, then paradoxically, through the impossibility 
of every possibility, an infinite as opposed to finite possibility: 
When someone faints, we call for water, eau de Cologne, smelling salts, but when 
someone wants to despair, then the word is: Get possibility, get possibility, 
possibility is the only salvation. A possibility – then the person is despairs breaths 
again, he revives again, for without possibility a person seems unable to breath. 
At times the ingeniousness of the human imagination can extend to the point of 
creating possibility, but at last – that is, when it depends upon faith – then only 
this helps, that for God everything is possible.16 
The difference between the possible and the actual is an ontological one and it at the heart of 
understanding the passionate self. 
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Infinite Freedom 
Heidegger was wrong to say that Kierkegaard had no ontology.17 The opposite is the case. 
You cannot understand Kierkegaard at all if you do not grasp his ontology. The irony is, with 
respect to Heidegger’s own debt to Aristotle, this ontology is Aristotelianέ Kierkegaard 
framed his rejection of Hegel as a return to Aristotleν especially the latter’s explanation of 
change or motion (țίνησȚς).18 This account has become so common-place to us now that we 
have great difficulty in understanding what Aristotle’s problem was, such that we think his 
solution is obvious. Change is the actualisation of a potentiality. This definition, however, 
would be little more than saying that change is change. We need, therefore, to examine 
Aristotle’s problem in greater depth to see how Kierkegaard transforms it. 
τne person who did take Aristotle’s problem seriously was Pierre Aubenqueέ His 
book Le Problème de l’être chez Aristote, essai sur la problématique aristotélicienne is a 
controversial and heterodox interpretation of Aristotle’s ontology, but it does offer us a way 
into Kierkegaard’s own ontologyέ19 Most interpreters of Aristotle would combine his 
ontology and theology. Aubenque does not. He separates them. Theology is not the science of 
being. The meaning of being is not the same as theology. Being is not God. Indeed being is 
not a being at all. Because being is not any being whatsoever, it is not an actuality, even the 
pure actuality of the Prime Mover. How does this separation of theology and ontology 
transform the way we think about Aristotle’s account of change or motion? In the traditional 
                                                 
17
 Martin Heidegger, Being and Time, trans. by John Macquarrie and Edward Robinson (Oxford: Wiley-
Blackwell, 1962), p. 494n. 
18
 For an excellent account of the importance of țίνησȚς to the whole of Kierkegaard’s work, see Clare Carlisle, 
Kierkegaard’s Philosophy of Becoming : Movements and Positions (Albany: State University of New York 
Press, 2005). 
19
 Pierre Aubenque, Le Problème de l’être chez Aristote, essai sur la problématique aristotélicienne (Paris: 
Presses Universitaires de France, 1962), pp. 448–456. For an explanation of the heterodox nature of Aubenque’s 
interpretation of Aristotle’s ontology, see Joseph εoreau, ‘δa problématique aristotélicienne’, Revue 
Philosophique de la France et de l’Étranger, 153 (1963), 365–71. For his own more orthodox view, see Joseph 
εoreau, ‘Remarques sur l’ontologie aristotélicienne’, Revue Philosophique de Louvain, 75 (1977), 577–611. 
17 
 
commentary change is ultimately explained theologically.20 Change is described through the 
difference between potentiality and actuality, and priority is given to actuality, since nothing 
potential could exist without a prior actuality, and without a pure actuality we would have an 
infinite regress. 
Can change be interpreted ontologically rather than theologically? This is Aubenque’s 
gambit. To explain change ontologically would mean reversing the relation between 
potentiality and actuality, on the one hand, and change, on the other. It is not the difference 
between potentiality and actuality that explains change, but the meaning of change, which is a 
specific interpretation of being, that explains the difference between potentiality and 
actuality. The problem of change is how the unity of something can be maintained over 
multiple determinations. How can Socrates both be young and old, pale and tanned, and still 
be the same Socrates? The answer to this question cannot just be that Socrates has the 
potential to be young, old, pale and tanned, because then we are just going around in circles. 
The answer is in the meaning of being as such, and that being has two meanings for Aristotle, 
essential and accidental. There is no contradiction between the one and the multiple because 
Socrates is not one and multiple in the same sense. He is essentially one and accidentally 
multiple. It is the difference between these two meanings of being that explains the difference 
between potentiality and actuality. If there were only one meaning of being, essential, then 
there would be only actuality and no potentiality. Likewise, if being were only accidental, 
then there would be only potentials and no actualities. 
Being is nothing but what we say about being. It only has a referential meaning. 
Being has a meaning because we speak about being. This is why being is not a genus for 
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Aristotle. When we speak about being we are not speaking about this or that thing, rather the 
meaning of being is the way we speak about things, how we refer to them. The being we are 
speaking of is the being of the sublunary world.21 The being of the world is the being of 
movement. This being is incomplete in two ways: it is fragmented in time and is always 
changing (becoming other to itself, to use Aristotle’s expression)έ What is important to stress 
here is the being we speak of is incomplete. In this sense, the being of movement relates to 
Aristotle’s definition of the infiniteέ 
It can come as a surprise to many that Aristotle is a philosopher of the infinite, for 
they associate him with the finite.22 Is not the universe itself finite for Aristotle, and does he 
not speak of the infinite as irrational? But in both cases Aristotle is speaking of an infinite 
thing, either an infinite universe or an infinite bound series, but not an infinite process. An 
infinite process is not irrational because it does not imply a bounded totality that would be 
infinite; in other words, an actual infinite magnitude. If infinity is to have a meaning, then it 
can only be as a potentiality, but we have to careful by what we mean by ‘potential’ hereέ The 
possibility of confusion lies in the fact that Aristotle does describe infinity as an actuality, but 
it is like the actuality of a day or a contest rather than an infinite magnitude (Phys. 206a 21-
5).23 The infinite is like a day or contest in that it is not all there at once. When we say the day 
or contest is happening, we do not mean all the instants of the day are happening. The 
difference, however, between the infinite, and the day or contest, is that the latter are finite 
wholes. The day and the contest come to an end, whereas the infinite does not. The infinite is 
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an imperfect or incomplete actuality. It remains permanently unfulfilled. Because the infinite 
is not a whole, it is not a ‘this’έ It is not a thing or substanceέ It is not the coming to be of 
something, but ‘coming to be’ as such that never comes to an endέ 
The being of motion is infinite in this sense. It is an imperfect or incomplete actuality. 
Aristotle says as much in the Greek: ἠ Ĳοῦ įυȞȐȝİȚ ὄȞĲος ἐvĲİȜȑχȚα, ᾗ ĲοȚοῦĲοȞ țίȞηıίς ἐıĲȚȞ 
(change is the actuality of that which is potential as such) (Phys. 201a10).24 It is because 
being is incomplete, always coming to be, that there is a difference between potentiality and 
actuality. If being were complete, then nothing would come into existence (or go out of 
existence), for everything would be what it is necessarily. There would be, then, no motion. 
Another way of understanding the incompleteness of being, at least at the level of the 
mundane world, is that nothing is what it is. Socrates is never perfectly Socrates; the apple 
tree is never perfectly the apple tree, and so on. It is because everything is never what it is 
that everything is fragmented in time, and always becoming other to itself. This explains also 
why being is said in to ways, essentially and accidentally. If everything is essentially what it 
is, then there would be no accidental properties. On the contrary, in this world, we see 
everything is on the way to being itself but never wholly becomes itself. The being of the 
world is the being of infinite motion or change. Nothing actually is what it potentiality is. Or 
in this world, potentiality always exceeds actuality. It is this overflowing of potentiality that 
explains why being is always in motion. 
While Aristotle speaks of being objectively (in terms of the natural processes of 
generation and decay), Kierkegaard does so subjectively. It is not a matter of whether 
Kierkegaard gets Aristotle right or not, whatever that might mean, because he does not set 
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himself up as a scholar of Aristotle.25 What matters is how he uses or is inspired by Aristotle. 
Like him, change or motion is at the heart of his understanding of being, and being is 
understood as infinite in the way explained by Aubenque. We can see this in perhaps the 
most difficult and dense pages of Philosophical Fragments, which Johannes Climacus 
describes as an interlude, ‘Is the Past more Necessary than the Future, or Has the Possible by 
Having Become Actual Become more Necessary than It Was?’26 
Kierkegaard understands change or motion ontologically as ‘coming into existence’έ 
We must distinguish between something that already exists and changes, and ‘coming into 
existence’έ Coming into existence is movement from possibility to actuality, from non-being 
to being. What is necessary does not change, because what is necessary just is. This means 
that non-being must really exist, otherwise we would not be able to distinguish between 
‘coming into existence’ and what is necessaryέ Because the necessary just is, it does not 
‘suffer’ actualityέ To suffer actuality means that the possible is annihilated in two waysν just 
this possibility is annihilated in actuality by ‘coming into existence’, and all the other 
possibilities are annihilated because just this possibility is actualised. If there were not this 
difference between ‘non-being’ and being as such, and if non-being did not precede being, 
then there would be no ‘coming into existence’έ What is would be, and there would be no 
change in being. All there would be would only be the necessary attributes of being, and there 
would no difference between existence and essence.  
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Existence, as opposed to essence, is temporal, for ‘coming into existence’ happens in 
time. When we speak of essences, we are speaking of what is. Socrates is a wise man. But 
really we should say ‘Socrates was a wise man’έ For while Socrates lives change is possibleέ 
Only in his death is his essence revealed and fixed for eternity. Yet this essence might not 
have come into existence. We can speak of the past in two ways: the past as what has 
happened, and the past as the happening of what has happened (what Kierkegaard calls an 
‘intrinsic duplicity’27). We can say Socrates was a wise and he lived in Athens. Now he is 
dead those facts are necessary, but not as the original possibilities they once were. What is 
unchangeable has its origin in change; otherwise being would be necessary and not 
contingent. The past could have been different from what it was, and the past that does exist 
only exists because these possibilities were actualised, and not others. The difficulty here is to 
see that the actual past has it source in possibility, because if this possibility had not been 
actualised, then the past that now appears to us as unchangeable would not have ‘come into 
existence’έ 
Simply by happening the past shows that it is not necessary, for if it had not occurred 
then the necessary attributes would not be true (Socrates did not exist, he was not wise, and 
there was no Athens). We try to obscure the contingency of being by transforming the 
happening of what happens to something that has happened, but this is an ontological error 
for Kierkegaard. It is to confuse being with a being, existence with an essence (as though 
existence itself had an essence)έ What exists (essence) is not the same as ‘coming into 
existence’ of what exists (existence)έ I might marvel at the star in the sky, Kierkegaard 
remarks, and everything that it is, but one can also be astonished that it exists at all.28 
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The past is double. That an something happened is certain, but only because I am 
committed to its happening. To the latter I do not stand with certainty, but faith. Of course 
there are degrees of uncertainty. I might be more or less certain of the happening of the star 
than other historical events, but even there what I thought had been actualised might not have 
been, and there were other possibilities. Even the most rigorous science must be open to 
reality, and there are always future events that could lead to revisions of the past. To see the 
past as merely a collection of facts that are necessarily true would be to abolish what is past 
about the past as such, since it would merely be what we apprehend in the present now. The 
past of the past, the absolute past that distinguishes the past from the present or the future, is 
that the possible always remains with the past such that through the future it can transform 
the present. I believed that x had happened, but now I realised that there were other 
possibilities that had always been thereέ ‘The possibility,’ writes Kierkegaard, ‘from which 
emerged the possible that became the actual always accompanies that which came into 
existence and remains with the past, even though centuries lie betweenέ’29 
All events are contingent and uncertain. They are uncertain and contingent because 
they come out of the nothingness of non-being, and in their arrival just this possibility is 
annihilated, and all other possibilities. My relation to this happening can only be one of 
belief. I can only say ‘this happened’, but I cannot be certain that it had, otherwise its 
‘coming into existence’ would have been necessaryέ I can see the star in the sky, but I cannot 
see the transition from non-being to being, or the ‘multiple possible’ to the actualέ I have to 
believe that. The happening of what has happened is not an immediate perception or a fact. It 
is that through which I already grasp and reflect upon the factsέ ‘Belief,’ Kierkegaard writes, 
‘believes what it does not seeν it does not believe that the star exists, for that it sees, but it 
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believes that it has come into existenceέ’30 To doubt something is not the same as not to 
believe in the happening of something. The former is a modest doubt. I might doubt whether 
the star really is as I see it, but this is nothing as to refuse to believe the star had ever come 
into existence. This, Kierkegaard argues, is an act of will. It is to see everything in a different 
lightέ It would be to see one’s seeing another wayέ Yet one could not appeal to the facts to 
explain this change, for it is precisely these facts one now views otherwise. Towards the 
actual one has knowledge; towards the possible, the happening of the actual, one can only 
have faith, but faith you must have. 
With this difficult and arcane discussion of Kierkegaard’s ontology via Aristotle, we 
might feel we have wandered far away from our original question as to whether he is still 
relevant to our age. This is not a matter of whether professional philosophers are still and will 
be reading him (something no doubt that would make him shudder), but whether he still 
speaks to us politically and why Tronti would have suggested now is the time to read him 
again. Capitalism is increasingly a problem of subjectivity. Human capital has now become 
the definition of capital as a whole, and Foucault is right to describe this as a singular event in 
history, whose consequences we are only beginning to understand. We need to think this 
event ontologically. This requires, first of all, we understand it in the proper way. This means, 
above all, we understand it historically, because this is precisely how capitalism obscures its 
own ‘coming into existence’, and that the only relation to the happening of capitalism as an 
event can be a matter of belief. It exists because we have faith in it. The worst way to read 
Kierkegaard is to think it is a matter of discovering an authentic subjectivity, for it is this 
authenticity that has been appropriated by capital. What is it that Kierkegaard teaches us? The 
possible always precedes and is greater than the actual. There is always an alternative, for 
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what is comes into existence and passes out of existence. Being is incomplete and imperfect 
and there is no necessity in this worldέ It is up to us, whoever ‘we’ are, to look for those 
possibilities that have always accompanied the past, but we will only do so by looking 
towards the future out of this infernal frozen present in which all possibilities appear to have 
been annihilated and whose slogan is ‘there is no alternative’. On the contrary, Kierkegaard 
tells us, ‘in existence the watchword is always “forward”έ’31 
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